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Articles

I

Foreword: Constituting Nations- Veils,

Disguises, Masquerades
Larry Catai Backer*
Since Plato's time, people in the West have been engaged in a
strange socio-legal combat. On one side of this engagement stand
those who would rip the veil from before power. On the other
stand those who profit from hiding the reality of power behind veils
of dogma or law. While some within the intellectual and political
elites in the West have engaged in intense search for what lies
behind the veil, others within those elites have as furiously worked
to reinvent those theories, systems or explanations that might
continue to shroud reality from a populace at once interested in the
'truth' and afraid to face it. Foucault again reminds us:
Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from
a reign of law that had already begun to recede into the past at a
time when the French Revolution and the accompanying age of
constitution and codes seemed to destine it for a future that was
at hand!
* Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law
<Icbll@psu.edu>. My thanks to Messrs. Strawson, Hanafin and Collins for the
opportunity to learn from their work.
1.

MICHEL FOUCAULT, I THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION

89

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

Law, like politics, and the
simultaneously as fabricated for
arranged for private advancement.
Lyotard reminds us that "[a] subject
grows fangs.
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constitution of states, exits
public consumption, and as
In this sense, Jean-Franqois
is whatever constitutes itself"2

Individuals implement social practice through action, through
mobilization of individuals within sub-groups who are motivated
to act through the invocation of cultural instructions-'greed is
good,' 'just war,' 'equality of opportunity,' and others have all
been cultural instructions invoked to mobilize social sub-groups
to act-and in acting assert communal power. Thus, communal
power does not lie with any particular person, or in any
particular position, or with an organization, or in a particular
thing, to the exclusion of others. Communal power lies in the
possibility of invocation-by any individual who can pull the
necessary cultural levers.3
The instrumentalities of law, like those of theory and
philosophy, have been used both to cloak and unmask the
relationship between authority and power. "[T]he legal system
itself was merely a way of exerting violence, of appropriating that
violence for the benefit of the few, and of exploiting the
dissymmetries and injustices of domination under cover of a
general law.",4 Yet, law accomplishes these tasks under a cover of
neutrality and impartiality. "This power inheres in the law's
constitutive tendency to formalize and to codify everything that
enters its field of vision. '
and selfof constitutionalism
The instrumentalities
determination have been used to constitute nations where none had
existed before and burst apart others that had thought themselves
whole and complete.6
India also serves as testament to the power to remake or create
a national consciousness even where cultural, linguistic and
(Robert Hurley, trans. Vintage Books 1990) (1978 trans.) (1976).
2. Jean-Franqois Lyotard, 'The Earth Had no Roads to Begin With,' in
POSTMODERN FABLES 103, 104 (Georges Van Den Abbeele, trans., University of
Minnesota Press 1997) (1993).
3. Larry Catd Backer, Agnus Dei: Miscausation and the Constitution of
Community, 2002, manuscript on file with author.
4.
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(Robert Hurley, trans. Vintage Books 1990) (1978 trans.) (1976).
5. Richard Terdiman, Translator'sIntroduction to PierreBourdieu, The Force
of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 809

(1987).
6.

See PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW (2001).
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religious difference are as great as those traits that these
communities share in common. The example of India has not been
lost on European integrationists. "The conclusion of a study of
various transnational links between the (then) six member
countries in the late 1960s was that 'if... India is seen as a nation,
'
then Europe may well be described as an emergent nation. ,7
European states, like India, have been adept at manipulating the
multiple possibilities for communal definition -emphasizing either
region, 'nation,' or empire as the appropriate repository of
sovereignty as advantage required.8
In the face of these disjunctions between the law as formulated
and the law as practiced, between what is seen and what is felt,
between what occurs and what is believed, many choose to remain
comfortably within the postulates and assumptions from which the
law springs. Much of what passes for the study of law in the United
States assumes the answers to the difficult foundational questions,
so that time can be spent worrying about the most efficient means
of enforcing those assumptions through law, or investigating the
utility of law to serve the assumptions. Even at its most theoretical,
this American approach is practical law in the service of the status
quo, of the grundnorm, the justificatory principles on which social
ordering is based.9 The more difficult task, the more discomfiting
task, requires focusing a critical eye on the very foundations on
which legal and other ordering systems are based. Such an
undertaking constitutes the core strength of any normative
system-the power to provoke, survive and transform itself on the
basis of invited constant self-examination. To those closed and
ultimately decadent systems in which such thoroughgoing selfevaluation of the most fundamental level of organizational
structuring is forbidden, this exercise is viewed as a sign of
weakness and indecision. Yet the opposite is true. Systems unused
to critical self-examination tend to fall away when the veil is ripped
away from the fundamental illusions on which such systems are
based.
The three articles that follow provide a window behind the veil
of law, constitutionalism and the creation of nations. The subjects
7. John Pinder, European Community and Nation-State: A Case for a
Neofederalism?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION: READINGS ON THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 189, 192 (Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander
C-G Stubb, eds., Lynne Rienner Pub., 2nd ed., 1998).
8. Larry CatA Backer, The Euro and the European Demos: A Reconstitution,
2002 Y.B. EUR. LAW (Oxford) - (forthcoming 2002).
9.

See HANS KELSON, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE(1945).
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of their study- Ireland/Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestinestand at the psychological core of Western legal and political
theorizing since the middle of the 20th century. Each paper
focuses, for the most part, on the Western exercise in critical selfexamination, ripping veils of misdirection in the constitution of
systems of governance or ideas of the nature and extent of the
constitution of nations.
John Strawson examines the multiple realities of legal
discourses of Israel/Palestine. ° He exposes the many irreconcilable
layers of discourse, of normative reality, used to construct the
foundational norms of an Israeli state and those used to construct a
Palestinian nation. "The legal issues of self-determination, human
rights and the law of war lie at the heart of the problem not as
passive legal doctrine, but as I shall argue as contested narratives.""
The post colonialist view of Edward Said provides insights into the
problem of two visions occupying the same geographic space. 2 On
the one hand, the Oslo Accords "reappear as colonial instruments
through which the occupied agreed to certain terms of their
occupation."' 3 Yet on the other hand, Israel is constructed against a
different set of colonialisms. "The realization of Israel takes place
in the context of weakness, distaste and horror .... The Western
constructions of the East merge with the construction of the Jew.
Whereas the East is a disordered and backward space, the Jews are
disordered Other within. Palestinians and Israeli Jews are thus
condemned to a relational existence in both space and
representation."'"
Nation, within this context, is devoid of a
geography, or in another sense, a single geography supports
multiple conceptions of nations stacked one on the other.
Immigration and self-determination by one is viewed as invasion
and national destruction by the other. Aggressive opposition to
immigration and rejection is viewed as an extension of the sort of
genocidal religious prejudice and nation rejection that had followed
the other since the 2nd century of the common era. Law offers a
limited promise in this situation. "Wisdom in law is the ability to
construct the competing arguments in a relational form.""
10. John Strawson, Reflections on Edward Said and the Legal Narratives of
Palestine:Israeli Settlements and PalestinianSelf-Determination, 20 PENN ST. INT'L
L. REV. 363 (2002).
11. Id. at 364.
12. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM: WESTERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ORIENT
(1978).
13. Strawson, supra note 11, at 380.
14. Id. at 384.
15. Id. at 384.
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Patrick Hanafin"6 and Barry Collins17 explore the realities of
Ireland from two different perspectives. Hanafin deconstructs the
imagined reality of Ireland as imposed by its modern founders.
Here is a chronicle of personal fantasy adroitly manipulated into
state policy. I' Here is art--the aesthetic turn- transformed into the
mythology of the origin and character of the state.
Yet paradoxically this projection of mythical rhetoric led to the
instantiation of a political reality that was to reflect the values of
this imagined Gaelic Romantic notion of Ireland. This new
state was indeed a fake. Yet, it was for its citizens only too real
in its narrow minded, craven 'bureaucratic dinginess.' This use
of rhetoric by the elite reflects Threadgold's thesis that the
telling of stories by elites can lead to the creation of particular
institutional realities.' 9
This myth making was not focused on the arts or theater. Politics
and the law provided the necessary stage for mythmaking on this
scale. The Irish Constitution itself served the purpose which in preLaw, and
literate Greece had been reserved for Homer.
particularly foundational-law making, provided the supreme
authoritative site on which these myths could not only be created,
but also from which a state could be established along the aesthetic
lines of the myth.'
Neutral provisions of basic law, such as this,
have been used to subvert the very order they represented." In the
case of Ireland, "Constitutional documents give the notion of
identity in diversity, a means of binding together the diverse strands
of the polity into a cohesive whole. This may be taken to be the
illusion of identic wholeness to which politics, both postcolonial and
otherwise, succumb."22
16.

Patrick Hanafin, Constitutive Fiction: Postcolonial Constitutionalism in

Ireland, 20 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 339 (2002).
17. Barry Collins, The Belfast Agreement and the Nation that "Always Arrives
at its Destination," 20 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 385 (2002).
18. See Hanafin, supra note 16, at 344.
19. Id. at 351 (citing TERRY THREADGOLD, FEMINIST POETICS: POIESIS,
PERFORMANCE, HISTORIES 148 (1997)).

20.

"The aim of the Constitution's primary framer, Eamon de Valera, was to

create a more authentic notion of Ireland than that contained within the text of the
1922 Constitution. In this sense, the Constitution of 1937 acted as a belated means
of enunciating the elite's notion of a separate Irish polity." Hanafin, supra note 13,
at 352.
21. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a
Constitutional State: Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1

(1998).
22. Hanafin, supra note 16, at 359.

Ireland thus privileged the Gaelic-

Romantic tradition "in the postcolonial period due to the emergence of the
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This normative function of constitution making mirrors the
acts of judicial law making in the United States. In the U.S., "all
sides attempt to use the courts, as vehicles for the approval of
lifestyle. In this enterprise, particular facts make no differencecultural facts are the real issue, facts completely disembodied from
the concrete." 3 The constitution of Ireland thus operates on
several planes-as an ordering document, as the focus of the
constitution of the nation, as a memorialization of a catalogue of
the national essence. Yet, the "so-called monolithic notion of
Irishness, which it is assumed
is captured in the text, is not the end
24
of the constitutional story.,
Barry Collins looks at the constitution of Ireland from the
context of a different ordering document, the Belfast Agreement.25
While Hanafin shows the way in which De Valera used the
authority of the Irish constitution to memorialize a mythology of
the Irish,26 the authors of the Belfast Agreement construct through
that Agreement a fictive retroactive foundation of a new legal order
for Ireland.
In relation to a reading of the Belfast Agreement, an obvious
question poses itself: How does the nation fit into this logicaojuridical paradox of legal authority? ....On the one hand, the
constitutional discourse must be the embodiment of the nation:
In order to claim legal authority it must invoke the authority of
the nation as the entity from which legal authority is derived.
On the other hand, the constitution must itself bring the nation

adherents of this philosophy as the dominant group in the spectrum of Irish
nationalist thought." Id. at 349. The Framers thus found it impossible to reconcile
their theocratic aspirations with their republican ideals, a task Hanafin considers
impossible, "as the divine and the secular are twin faiths that cannot live in
harmony." Id.
23. Larry CatA Backer, Tweaking Facts, Speaking Judgment: Judicial
Transmogrification of Case Narrative as Jurisprudence in the United States and
Britain,6 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 611 (1998).

Law as judgment and jurisprudence as norm-affirming teaching have little
to do with the stories presented.... The "facts" of each case merely
provides a point of departure for the expression of judgments and
theories pre-understood, and pre-digested. The relationship can only be
understood by taking into account the critical mediating role played by
the stories as restructured by the courts. The particular stories
themselves become an object of law-making as they are reconstituted to
serve as a vehicle for the expression of judgment.
Id., at 633.

24. Hanafin, supra note 16, at 360.
25. Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations, Dublin, Belfast, London,
1998, cited at Collins, supra note 17, at n.1.
26. See Hanafin, supra note 16, at 341.
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into existence by constituting (or embodying) the nation;
thereby authorising the nation as a source of law. In short,
constitutional discourse must presuppose that the nation already
exists in order for the nation to be produced as an origin for
legal discourse.27
In the Belfast agreement it is never clear "which origin, which
nation is being claimed as the legitimating authority of the new
legal institutions in Northern Ireland."2 And in this ambiguity of
multiple essences tied to a single geography, Ireland/Northern
Ireland comes to resemble Israel/Palestine as to its paradoxes and
multiple existences.
Thus, Collins provides the essence of
connection between the ambiguities of multiple construction
trenchantly explored by Strawson and the aesthetics of nation
building within the four corners of a constitution explored by
Hanafin.
For Collins, the Belfast Agreement evidences the sort of postnationalism that appears at the heart of the political transformations of the last fifty years. This is a post-nationalism of multiple
identities co-existing within a single geography which operate
jointly but remain separate.29 The post-nationalism of Ireland
brought to life by Collins has been freed from the parochial
concerns of Ireland and now infects much of the rest of the world.
American academics have begun to explore these issues in form of
multi-identity issues.' In another sense, the national ambiguity and
post-nationalism of the Belfast Agreement replicates the tensions
and approaches to integration within Europe.3
27.
28.
29.

Collins, supra note 17, at 388.
Id. at 392.
Collins rightly cites to the work of Richard Kearney in this respect. See
RICHARD KEARNEY, POSTNATIONALIST IRELAND (1997).
30. See, e.g., Leslie G. Espinoza, Multi-Identity: Community and Culture, 2 VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y & CULTURE 23 (1994); Berta Esperanza Hermndez-Truyol &
Kimberly A. Johns, Global Rights, Local Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An
InternationalHuman Rights Critique of Immigration and Welfare "Reform", 71 S.
CAL. L. REv. 547, 567-68 (1998). See also Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth
Chronicle:RacialMixture, Latino-CriticalScholarship,and the Black-White Binary,
75 TEX. L. REv. 1181 (1997) (interrogating the black-white binary for understanding the relationship of racial elites with subordinated groups other than
African-Americans, and suggesting alternatives to that antique model).
31. "Harmonization, subsidiarity and cultural solicitude describe the variables
of the matrix within which the union of Europe develops. The particular way in
which a federal system is manifested, as well as the relationships between supranational, national and local power, will be a function of the intersection of these
three parameters. Within these parameters, federal systems can assume an almost
unlimited number of forms, and the form of any federal system can shift depending
on the relative importance of each of the parameters in every federal system."
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The post-nationalism of the Belfast Agreement described in
Collins, like the 1937 Irish Constitution discussed in Hanafin, and
the constructions of Israeli and Palestinian nations considered in
Strawson, all arrive at their destinations.32 The fact that none of
those destinations might include the addressees of these legal and
political manifestations again demonstrates the ways in which legal
and constitutional discourse veil the operation of power within
democratic systems founded on notions of the rule of law. Indeed,
the arrival itself can be understood in a number of ways. The first is
that the nation is not constituted like Athena fully formed as a
mature adult. Rather, nations must be "understood in terms of the
way in which its [the nations'] movement from one discursive
position to the next re-orders political subjectivity."33 The second is
that the internal content of nation is a function of its external
projection.
On one level, it is the absence of the nation as a point of origins
that guarantees the effectiveness of the Belfast Agreement.
Alternatively, what gives the Belfast Agreement its political
currency is the extent to which it allows contradictory national
claims to be invoked indirectly in a legal form; the extent to
which the Agreement can be seen by nationalists and unionists
to "belong to" each of them separately to the exclusion of each
other. 34
The trick of the Belfast Agreement "is that it is through its 'neutral'
legal institutions that the subject is constituted as the addressee of
the nation!"35 We have seen this trick unmasked before. Hanafin
describes a constitutional process in which a neutral document-the
Irish constitution, purported to encompass an "Irish self that was
posited by the post-colonial elite [that] was pure and clean,
expelling what it considered to be 'impure' elements. ' ' Strawson

Larry Cati Backer, ForgingFederalSystems Within a Matrix of Contained Conflict:
The Example of the European Union, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1331 (1998).

32. The reference that Collins makes here is to Lancan's statement that "a
letter always arrives at its destination." Jacques Lancan, Declarations of
Independence, 15 NEW POLl. Sci. 7 (1986).

33. Collins, supra note 17, at 405.
34. Collins, supra note 17, at 406.
35. Id. at 407.
36. Hanafin, supra note 16, at 357. "Like the characters in the "Nausicaa"
episode of Joyce's Ulysses, the Framers of the Constitution wished to conceal the
alternative narratives of Irishness, which existed within the body politic, creating a
society where control of the body politic as well as the individual body was to be
the order of the day." Id. at 357.
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describes the universalizing inconsistent articulations of the British
Mandate.
Whereas "Ashrawi sees the narrative as confiscated, the Israelis
see the emergence of the Palestinian identity as a violent
challenge to their legitimacy, as a negation of their identity.
Israel and Jordan, between them, had effectively removed the
Palestinians from the scene. It is all the more ironic that the
Israeli victory of the 1967 war, which reunited British
Mandatory Palestine, constituted the most decisive spatial
advance not just the project of a greater Israel, but also for
Palestinian nationalism. In a moment of military supremacy,
Israel brought itself head-on into an existential 37collision with its
national Other, the Palestinian national project.
In each of these cases, the nation constitutes a veil through which
power relationships are established and then contained by law.
The American constitution, in a moment of post-modern
premonition proclaimed: "nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law."38 And so it
does. Yet it does much more. Strawson, Hanafin and Collins work
might suggest a deeper interrogation of the majesty of those words.
In the name of the nation, the state may take life, liberty or
property, as long as it operates within a legal discourse deemed
appropriate to the occasion. And it is for the federal government to
make that determination in the last instance. Here, as Collins
might suggest, "the nation becomes retroactively installed for the
subject as an authorization of legal discourse."3 9 Strawson might
remind us that the 14th Amendment's command provides another
example of the post-colonial master-slave binary, an act of colonial
imposition by the triumphant Northern States on the vanquished
and colonized states of the former Confederacy. 4° Hanafin would
help us understand the way in which the 14th Amendment, like the
1937 Irish Constitution, was meant as "a textual projection of a
nationalist fantasy of wholeness.",4' A new nation was constructed
37. Strawson, supra note 10, at 383.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
39. Collins, supra note 17, at 407.
40. "While colonialism has withered, a postcolonial world has taken shape in
which the world replicates elements of the old order through which the West
assumes a centrality against the periphery of the ex-colonies.... In this, law is an
important site of imagery and representation which attempts to bestow legitimacy
on the metropolitan center as a center of the legal order." Strawson, supra note
10, at 363-64.
41. Hanafin, supra note 16, at 359. Indeed, Hanafin draws on work focused on
the United States and Sri Lanka to inform his reading of the Irish experience,
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from out of the ruins of the American Civil War, in many respects a
very different nation from the union that existed in 1861. The 14th
Amendment was among those textual revisions that memorialized
the normative foundations and ideals of this new state. "[W]hen we
are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being, the development of which could not have
been foreseen completely by the most gifted of her begetters. It
was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an
organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much
sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation."" This last
overlay of Holmes, when melded with the theory in action of
Strawson, Hanafin and Collins, serves as a final admonition to
"avoid both the zookeeper's approach to culture and the
zookeeper's approach to identity. We must avoid the possibility of
what Jurgen Habermas describes as 'administrative
preservation of
43
cultures like forms of endangered species."'

citing, Roshan De Silva, Ambivalence, Contingency and the Failure of Exclusion:
The Ontological Schema of the 1972 Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka, 5
Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 365 (1996) (Sri Lanka); ANNE NORTON, REFLECTIONS ON
POLITICAL IDENTITY (1988) (United States); and DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, OUR
ELUSIVE CONSTITUTION:

SILENCES,

PARADOXES, PRIORITIES

(1997) (United

States).
42. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (per Justice Holmes).
43. Larry Catd Backer, Not a Zookeeper's Culture: LatCrit Theory and the
Search for Latino/a Authenticity in the US., 4 TEXAS HiSP. J.L. & POL'Y 7, 17-18
(1998) (citing Jurgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in ConstitutionalStates,
1 EUR. J. PHIL. 128, 142 (1993)). Habermas, in this respect, may provide the basis
for a cynical reading of Derrida's definition of the European democratic
hegemonic norm as including "respecting difference, idioms, minorities,
singularities, but also the universality of formal law, the desire for translation,
agreement and univocity, the law of the majority, opposition to racism, nationalism
and xenophobia." JACQUES DERRIDA, THE OTHER HEADING: REFLECTIONS ON
TODAY'S EUROPE 78-79 (1992).

